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ABSTRACT
Using the Papathoma Tsunami Vulnerability Assessment Model
To Forecast Probable Impacts, and Planning Implications, of a
500-year Tsunami in Cayucos, California
Andrew Robert Marshall

This report focuses on using the Papathoma Tsunami Vulnerability Assessment
Model (PTVA) to demonstrate the vulnerability of Cayucos to a 500-year tsunami, and
uses the results to inform specific planning recommendations. By modeling inundation
with GIS and analyzing building attributes via the PTVA model, this study has gone
beyond any previous vulnerability assessments of Cayucos. Findings include:
delineation of the most vulnerable areas, estimates of numbers of lost civic buildings,
commercial buildings and houses, as well as estimates of people displaced from tsunami
damaged homes. The report goes on to discuss what mitigation measures are in place
and what further specific steps could be taken to ensure the long term sustainability of
the town and help reduce future tsunami losses.
In the absence of fully developed, and accessible assessment tools; local
planners have had only basic information to assess the community’s tsunami
vulnerability. The Papathoma Tsunami Vulnerability Assessment Model (PTVA) is a
validated method that uses available tsunami runup estimations and field data collection
to produce a detailed assessment of individual building survivability and overall
community vulnerability.
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1. Introduction
Tsunamis are among the most devastating natural hazards and can affect almost
any coast in the world. The Pacific Rim, known as the “Ring of Fire” to geologists, is a
very seismically active region where tectonic plates that form the seafloor collide with the
continents. The subduction zones that form at the tectonic plates’ boundaries are
capable of producing earthquakes that generate tsunamis that can radiate across the
whole Pacific.
Tsunami waves have an extremely long wavelength and little height as they
travel through the open ocean. They can cross an ocean at up to 600 miles per hour
while causing little surface disturbance (CA OES, 2013). Upon entering shallow water a
tsunami, like any wave, “feels bottom”, its wavelength decreases and height increases.
The resulting wave rushes onshore, often more like a rapidly rising tide than a curling,
breaking wave. Most tsunami events consist of multiple waves. While the waves
themselves are destructive, wave driven debris can cause much of the damage to the
built environment. The severity of a tsunami is not measured by the height of the wave,
but rather by the level of runup. Runup is the highest elevation on shore that the
tsunami waves attain. The term inundation area is used to describe the inland area that
is flooded. The inundation area is determined by local topography and runup height.
Depending on these factors tsunami inundation may extend many kilometers inland, or
only impact a narrow coastal margin.
The west coast of the United States is vulnerable to Pacific wide tsunamis
caused by distant earthquakes, as well as locally generated tsunamis. There have been
a total of 419 recorded tsunami events in the history of the U.S.A. (National Geophysical
Data Center n.d.). The majority of these (308) have originated in the Pacific Ocean
(National Geophysical Data Center n.d.).
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The areas of the world that are most likely to produce Pacific wide tsunamis (teletsunamis) are well known. Those most threatening to California include the Cascadia
Subduction Zone off the Oregon coast, and the Aleutian Islands Subduction Zone (Miller,
2014). Tele-tsunamis can be very destructive but with modern technology their
generation and arrival can be accurately predicted, and often there is time to evacuate
and prepare. For example, a tsunami produced by the Cascadia Subduction Zone
would arrive in California one to two hours after generation, while a tsunami from the
Aleutian Islands would arrive in four to six hours (Miller, 2014).
The California coast could also be affected by tsunamis generated by local
earthquakes or underwater landslides. These types of tsunamis can be just as
destructive as or even more so than tele-tsunamis. The largest tsunami recorded in
California was locally generated by an earthquake in the Santa Barbara Channel in
1812. It caused runup of 35 feet in Santa Barbara and 50 feet in Gaviota (SLO County,
2011). As locally generated tsunamis strike very shortly after their generating event,
there is often little or no advance warning of their approach. A local tsunami could be
onshore in as little as ten minutes after its generating event (Miller, 2014).
California has experienced many recorded tsunamis. However compared to
other locations on the Pacific Rim, historical events in California have been mild. The
one notable exception would be events in the northern Californian town of Crescent City,
which has had about 30 tsunamis in the last 80 years and has suffered the loss of
dozens of lives (Padilla, 2012).
San Luis Obispo County, on the central coast of California, has also experienced
tsunamis, but nothing that could be considered a major event. The County is vulnerable
to tele-tsunamis (those generated over 1000 miles away) as well as tsunamis that could
be generated by local faults (SLO County, 2013). It has been affected by all of the
2

notable Pacific wide tele-tsunamis of the last century, including the 2011 Tohoku
tsunami, which caused $500,000 in damage to docks and piers in Morro Bay (SLO
County, 2013). Typically, tsunami runups experienced in San Luis Obispo have not
exceeded more than a few meters above sea level, and caused only limited damage and
no recorded loss of life (SLO County, 2013).
Coastal areas in San Luis Obispo County are also vulnerable to sea level rise
that can magnify tsunami impacts. The State Hazard Mitigation Plan estimates that on
the central coast, sea level has the potential to rise between 1.38 and 5.48 feet by the
year 2100 (CA OES, 2013). This could increase the damage created by a tsunami not
just by increasing runup height, but also by causing the erosion of natural protective
structures like beaches and bluffs.
Because of the relatively benign history of tsunamis in most of California, the risk
to the state has been given little regard for years outside of scientific circles. Then the
Pacific wide damage from the 2011 tsunami called everyone’s’ attention to tsunami risk
in California. Since then there have been serious efforts in the state to increase tsunami
mapping and mitigation efforts as well as to study possible impacts. California is now on
the cusp of adding tsunami mitigation to various state laws.
Technical studies of tsunami modeling and hazard analysis are currently being
carried out to determine probabilistic tsunami return intervals that will be developed into
tsunami hazard maps; much like how seismic terrestrial hazards are assessed in
California. Probabilistic models of tsunamis in California are currently unavailable but are
being developed by the California Geologic Survey through the California Seismic
Hazard Mapping Act (CGS, 2015). They are considered to provide a better
understanding of the hazard than a single “worst case” type of model. The probabilistic
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maps will make understanding a location’s risk easier for local decision makers, and
tsunami planning.
Additionally future tsunami runup predictions will be more accurate; researchers
are developing models that take into account complex local bathymetry and can predict
tsunami magnitudes potentially generated by specific faults (CA OES, 2013). Others
are working to understand how the dynamic forces of tsunami waves interact with the
urban environment (California Tsunami Policy Working Group, 2014). In the future,
based on this expanding body of knowledge, there may be federal and state action taken
to implement advanced tsunami mitigation. Some of this mitigation could be in the form
of subsidized insurance and enhanced building codes. These are both currently being
developed: FEMA will soon add tsunami inundation return intervals to their Flood
Insurance Rate Maps (CGS, 2015). Also, a national engineering committee is working to
establish building design standards that resist tsunamis for incorporation into the
International Building Code by 2018 (CGS, 2015).
Additionally FEMA is currently working towards developing a tsunami modeling
addition to their HAZUS program (CGS, 2015). The HAZUS program is a publically
available, GIS based, multi-hazard risk modeling program. The program is able to
assess the physical, economic and social impacts of hurricanes, floods and
earthquakes. It can be used to identify vulnerabilities for mitigation before an emergency
event occurs or for rapid needs assessments after. Having this program developed for
tsunamis will add a significant capability to local planners’ ability to assess their tsunami
vulnerability.
In addition to scientific research there is a movement to formulate and implement
mitigation strategies. An interdisciplinary group of researchers, scholars and policy
experts formed the California Tsunami Policy Working Group to study how California can
4

prepare for the next tsunami. Their efforts yielded 47 recommendations that shared
three goals: build a solid foundation for mitigation, practice risk-based land-use and
construction, and enhance emergency management (The California Tsunami Policy
Working Group, 2014). If the recommendations can be implemented; California will
have tsunami mitigation integrated into many aspects of government including: land use
planning, building codes, interagency relationships and university education. Their study
presents the state-of-the-art of California tsunami mitigation planning.
There are many resources available for local jurisdictions to use for
understanding their tsunami risk and implementing mitigation measures. These tools are
well suited for working at a county or regional level, but a gap exists in planning at the
community or neighborhood level. The FEMA HAZUS program will help to fill this gap
but until the tsunami modeling addition is fully developed, there are other methods that
planners can use to assess their community’s risk and identify their most vulnerable
areas.
The field of quantitatively assessing tsunami vulnerability and loss is young. It is
only in the last decade or so that serious research in this field has been accomplished,
and there are still unknown factors about how the built environment reacts to tsunami
loading and the dynamic forces of waves traveling through the built environment (CA
OES, 2013). Though the field is young, there is a usable, validated method to assess
tsunami vulnerability: the Papathoma Tsunami Vulnerability Assessment Model. Using
this relatively user friendly building vulnerability assessment methodology it is possible to
model what affect a tsunami event might have upon the built environment.

5

The San Luis Obispo County Local Hazard Mitigation Plan
San Luis Obispo County has taken active and appropriate steps toward
mitigating, or reducing or eliminating long term risk of, tsunamis. There are two County
documents governing tsunami mitigation: The San Luis Obispo County Local Hazard
Mitigation Plan (LHMP) (2013) and the Tsunami Emergency Response Plan (2011). The
San Luis Obispo County Fire Department and CAL FIRE have greatly contributed to the
effort by producing detailed inundation area maps that include evacuation routes and
other important features.
The San Luis Obispo County Local Hazard Mitigation Plan (2013) includes one
section on tsunami risk, and has one map illustrating the Cal OES defined tsunami
inundation zone. The map delineates these areas very broadly, simply showing the
entire coastal margin of the county as being included in the zone. It states that much of
the County is not very vulnerable to tsunamis as many areas protected by wide beaches,
dunes, or sea cliffs. Some specific areas that are more vulnerable are called out. They
include (among others): Cayucos Creek, Little Cayucos Creek, Old Creek and Willow
Creek in Cayucos.
The plan judges the probability of tsunamis affecting the County to be “somewhat
likely (between 1 and 10% chance in a given year)”, and states that “limited damage”
could occur in impacted areas. Secondary impacts like economic losses and health
impacts due to loss of function of facilities and evacuations are rated as “negligible”.
However, the plan states that tsunamis could result in damage to roads and bridges and
could devastate piers, docks, moored boats and agriculture (SLO County, 2013).
The LHMP offers estimates of the potential damages to infrastructure by various
disasters including tsunamis (Table 1.). These are worst case scenarios of damage to
critical structures and infrastructure. Assuming a 100% loss of all infrastructure in the
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inundation zone, the estimated potential damage to the county is estimated at $
2,171,998,000.. This is the second highest damage estimate of any hazard in the
LHMP.
Predictions of tsunami runups are given; citing a 1978 study that indicates the
Cayucos/Morro Bay coast could expect 100 and 500 year return interval tsunami runups
to be 9.5 feet and 24.2 feet respectively (SLO County, 2013). This is based on a teletsunami generated in the Aleutian Islands or the Chile-Peru trench, arriving at high tide.
If a tsunami were to occur during a storm, at high tide, an additional 14.5 feet could be
added to its height, producing 24 (100 yr) and 39 foot (500 yr) runups. These predictions
are consistent with historical tsunamis measured in other parts of California (SLO
County, 2013).

Table 1. LHMP Hazard Damage Estimates

Hazard

Total Building Replacement Value

Earthquake
Flooding
Wildfire
Tsunami
Adverse Weather
Slo County LHMP 2013

2,990,415,000
764,145,000
2,170,833,000
2,171,998,000
2,685,515,000

Estimated
Percent
Damage
100%

Estimated
Potential Damage
Value 2,990,415,000

50%
25%
100%
10%

382,072,500
542,708,250
2,171,998,000
268,551,500

Other hazards relating to tsunami impacts discussed in the LHMP include
earthquakes and coastal erosion. Earthquake potential in the County is high. There are
many active and inactive faults in the County, and four surrounding Cayucos: the
Cayucos, Oceanic, Cambria and Hosgri fault zones. The Cayucos fault zone is directly
beneath the town but considered inactive, with a low potential of fault rupture hazard.
The Oceanic fault is considered a moderate fault rupture hazard, but is several
7

kilometers north of town. The Cambria fault is also a moderate fault rupture hazard and
is mapped as going offshore north of Cayucos and returning to shore as a broad zone of
faults that pass through the town (SLO County, 2013). The LHMP states that the further
study of the Cayucos fault is needed prior to allowing structures to be built near the
mapped fault traces. The Hosgri fault system is located offshore, running parallel to the
coast, and is capable of producing up to a 7.3 magnitude earthquake (SLO County,
2013). It has been included in a HAZUS seismic risk assessment scenario in the LHMP,
but its tsunamigenic capacity was not evaluated or considered.
Coastal erosion is also a hazard in Cayucos. It is a complex issue that involves
local geology, exposure to wave energy, sea level rise and the built environment. Based
on these factors, coastal areas in SLO County are exposed to varying levels of erosion.
As coastal erosion takes place it can cause the retreat of bluffs and undermine
oceanfront structures. FEMA predicts that erosion may destroy one of every four
houses within 500 feet of the shoreline in the next 60 years (SLO County, 2013). In
addition to direct loss, coastal erosion can expose more structures to hazards
associated with the water front, like tsunami inundation.
In Cayucos many oceanfront homes are built on bluffs that are composed of
easily erodible Franciscan Mélange rock formations (SLO County, 2013). There is a
high erosion potential: an average year can see 6 to 10 inches of erosion, and during a
1983 storm some bluffs eroded as much as 20 feet inland (SLO, County, 2013).
Additionally, downtown Cayucos is built on unconsolidated riverine sediment, and is also
very susceptible to shoreline erosion.
The County has adopted tsunami mitigation measures via the LHMP that seek to
minimize the level of damage that could be inflicted. These apply to Cayucos and
include:
8

1. Provide the coastal cities assistance in updating their tsunami plans, maps, and
evacuation processes.
2. Provide training to appropriate agencies on changes to tsunami emergency plans
and pre-response plans and policies.
3. Maintain emergency responder pre-response plans for ongoing tsunami
inundation areas.
4. Install tsunami area warning signs (deferred).
TsunamiReady®
Additionally the County is in the process of becoming TsunamiReady®.
TsunamiReady® is a voluntary tsunami mitigation program administered by The National
Weather Service that focuses on raising a community’s level of preparedness through
educating emergency managers and the public about tsunami risk and improving
communications and emergency response plans. Becoming TsunamiReady® ensures
preparedness, confers recognition upon a community, and can put a community in an
improved position to receive federal and state grant funds. To become TsunamiReady®
a community must meet standard guidelines that are scaled to reflect the size of the
community. Since Cayucos is an unincorporated town, under the jurisdiction of San Luis
Obispo County, it is up to the county to implement the program, at a county wide level.
San Luis Obispo County is currently working with NOAA to become TsunamiReady® (E.
Boldt, NOAA, personal communication, May 18, 2015). This certification will also cover
other unincorporated coastal towns in the county like Avila Beach and Cambria.
Appendix B details the guidelines that must be attained, many of which are already met.
Cayucos is currently tied into the county’s warning siren system and covered by county
emergency response plans. The TsunamiReady® program will provide educational
programs as well as tsunami warning signs in Cayucos.
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Meeting the guidelines and becoming TsunamiReady® is a strong effort on the
part of the county to prepare for tsunamis and prevent the loss of life. It is a relatively
easy mitigation tool to implement as it does not require spending large amounts of funds
for building projects like some other mitigation methods do. Nor does it require the use
of potentially unpopular policies to accomplish, like some tsunami planning land use
decisions might.
Tsunami Emergency Response Plan
The SLO County Tsunami Emergency Response Plan is an appendix to the SLO
County Office of Emergency Services Emergency Response Operations Plan. The
document repeats much of what is written in the LHMP but offers more detail about
possible effects of tsunamis, these include:














Mass injuries
Emergency medical services disruptions, including hospitals
School disruptions
Hazardous materials releases
Fires
Need for short term evacuations
Utility disruptions: gas, electric, water, sanitation
Transportation system disruptions
Traffic management problems
Communication disruptions
Disease and health hazards
Loss of commerce and government resources

The Tsunami Emergency Response Plan cites a study done by the University Of
Southern California (for Cal EMA) estimating a general maximum tsunami runup on the
coast of SLO County being 40 feet (12.1m) above mean sea level. With this number in
mind the county established an evacuation zone of all coastal areas below 50 feet in
elevation, providing a ten foot elevation buffer between the estimated maximum
inundation level and the limit of the evacuated area. Sea level rise will amplify the
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impacts of tsunami runup in the future and cause this estimate to be an underestimation
in terms of runup above sea level and also the area inundated
SLO Fire Department Inundation Maps
The SLO County Fire Department and CAL FIRE developed a series of detailed
tsunami inundation maps for use by emergency responders (Appendix 1.). The
Northern Cayucos Tsunami Planning map (2011) offers this about the community’s
situation:
This small town has ingress and egress points at Highway 1 (north and south)
and Old Creek Rd to the east. The northern end of the town is expected to incur
major damage in the event of a large tsunami. The downtown area, including fuel
stations, schools and the local fire station are all well within the inundation zone,
as are many homes along the low-lying beach front properties.

These maps have been made available to emergency responders and can be viewed on
the SLO Fire Department’s website, but are otherwise not generally circulated.
Cayucos and the Need for This Study
Cayucos is a small beach community on Estero Bay in San Luis Obispo County
(Appendix C.). The economy is tourism based and the community is a peaceful, family
friendly getaway, popular with people from cities or inland areas. The laidback
downtown area fronts the ocean and has restaurants, cafes, wine tasting, hotels and
surfboard rentals. A historical pier is located in the downtown and serves as an
attraction and landmark. The population of the community is listed as 2,475 in the 2013
U.S. Census; however this number fluctuates by an unknown number seasonally as
visitors and part-time residents come and go. The downtown is low lying and much of
the community’s business district as well as the fire station, gas station, pier, and hotels
are located in the 500-year inundation zone. Also, hundreds of homes along the shore
are at risk.
11

It is recognized in the LHMP and the SLO County FD inundation maps that
Cayucos is at elevated risk to tsunamis. The map produced by Cal Fire and the SLO
County Fire Department is very detailed and valuable for understanding generally where
the hazard zone is in Cayucos. However, to better understand which specific areas in
the community are the most vulnerable, a more in depth type of study is needed, and the
small size of the community makes this level of analysis practical.
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2. Methodology
The method used in this study to assess the community’s tsunami vulnerability is
the Papathoma Tsunami Vulnerability Assessment Model (PTVA). This method for
calculating tsunami vulnerability and maximum loss was developed in the early 2000s by
Maria Papthoma-Kohle and Dale Dominey-Howes (researchers from the Universities of
New South Wales and Vienna respectively) (Dominey-Howes et al., 2007). It has been
validated, or ground truthed, by field research in the wake of the 2004 Boxing Day
tsunami. After the tsunami, researchers visited South Male’ Atoll in the Maldives and
found that tsunami damage closely correlated with PTVA estimations (Dominey-Howes
et al., 2007). The model has since been peer reviewed and applied in the Greek Islands
and Seaside, Oregon.
The PTVA model takes into account physical factors that influence a building’s
survivability during a tsunami, and rates the building’s overall vulnerability. Factors that
influence vulnerability include: inundation depth, building row number (from the water),
construction material, number of floors, building orientation, condition of building,
building surroundings and land cover. These attributes have been identified, through
analysis of tsunami damage assessment surveys and engineering reports as being the
most important factors affecting building survivability (Dominey-Howes et al., 2010).
Table 2 summarizes the attributes in weighted order as used in the study. The
scale follows a logical progression with a buildings level of exposure to inundation
ranking as more important than anything about the building itself. The two most highly
weighted attributes relate to the level of exposure and include Inundation depth and the
building’s row from the sea. These attributes categorize how high the inundation is and
how many buildings are in the way to bear the brunt of the wave force. These are the
main determinants of building survivability. The other attributes related to building
13

material, design and surroundings are considerably less important, but in aggregate can
serve to influence survivability.
The model assigns a score to each attribute. Buildings are inspected and raw
scores taken for each attribute. Raw scores for the eight data fields are converted into
ratios for comparison by dividing the individual score by the highest possible score for
that data field. This results in a standardization of scores to between 0 and 1 for each
data attribute. Next these ratio scores are weighted according to the weighting scale
developed by Papathoma and her associates’ expert judgement. To do this the ratio
scores for each attribute are multiplied by the weight associated with that attribute, they
are then summed. Where “a,b,c,d,e,f,g, and h” are the ratio scores of each attribute:
Vulnerability=(8xa)+(7xb)+(6xc)+(5xd)+(4xe)+(3xf)+(2xg)+(1xh)
The overall scores are then separated into five equal intervals to create a
vulnerability scale that ranges from low, medium low, medium, medium high to high.
These ratings represent predictions of relative vulnerability to damage, and not specific
damages. In the PTVA model, buildings that score “high” and “medium high” are
considered to be complete losses. Inundation depth is the most important factor in
deciding vulnerability, and those buildings that score “high” and “medium high” are
largely associated with higher inundation levels (>4 meters). Those buildings that receive
lower vulnerability scores would certainly sustain damage during a tsunami, but would
likely be repairable (Dominey-Howes et al., 2010).
While the original PTVA has been validated in the field after the 2004 Indian
Ocean tsunami, meaning that its results have roughly correlated with actual damages, it
is a first generation assessment tool. There have subsequently been criticisms of, and
suggested improvements to, the model. A common criticism of the original PTVA model
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is the manner in which attributes are weighted. The original model relies on the “expert”
judgement of its creators to weigh attributes. Other researchers have developed a
revised model of the PTVA and used “M-Macbeth” software in an attempt create a more
accurately weighted scale. This program allows a panel of experts to input their
individual weighting judgements, and then verifies their consistency and generates a
rated scale. This process produces a more accurate product with less subjectivity than
the original model. Also, researchers have suggested adding other building attributes to
the model such as: the presence of outdoor movable furniture, type of ground level
windows, foundation type, and insurance policy adequacy (Dall'Osso et al., 2009). It
would have been possible to add some of the additional attributes to the model for this
study, but others, like the foundation type (the presence or absence of a basement), or
insurance policy adequacy would be impossible to assess without entering buildings or
interviewing building owners. This would have been impossible to accomplish given the
number of buildings involved and the limited time allocated for the study. There have
been no published statistical comparisons of results between the original model and the
amended models to suggest that they offer significant benefits.
Additionally, some researchers criticize the PTVA model because it does not
account for the force of the tsunami itself and how it changes when encountering an
urban environment. These forces are undeniably very important to the vulnerability
equation. To attempt to address this, researchers are currently developing fragility curve
models to account for the dynamic forces of water against buildings. These models
relate water depth to the probability of structure failure and will allow for more accurate
building damage assessments (Wiebe, 2014). Given the current absence of usable
fragility curve models and limitations of time that this Cayucos study faced, and that the
updates to the model have not been proven to be any more accurate than the original, it
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was decided that the original PTVA would give sufficiently accurate results for the
planning purposes that the project was intended for.
The study was completed in 3 general steps.
1. GIS analysis to determine the flood area and the average water depths for each
building.
2. Data collection and application of the PTVA model.
3. Analysis of the data.

16

Table 2. PTVA Attributes in Descending Order of Weighted Importance
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GIS Analysis
To complete the study it was necessary to delineate the extent of the theoretical
tsunami runup in Cayucos, and then to calculate an average water depth for each
building. Water depth is the most important factor in determining building survivability
using the Papathoma Method. All of the files needed for the project were available on
the Cal Poly Kennedy Library’s GIS server.
First San Luis Obispo County data was obtained from the Cal Poly Library GIS
server. Files obtained included: DEM and hillshade raster files, parcel, mean shoreline,
roads and a building footprint (incomplete) vector shapefiles. The buildings layer from
the county was missing over a hundred residential structures. These were added to the
layer by overlaying the building layer onto a satellite image to view the buildings as they
are, and drawing in the missing buildings.
The DEM and hillshade files covered the entirety of SLO County and were very
large and slowed down computing speed. They were clipped to just the Cayucos area to
increase processing speed. This was done by making a 1,200 foot right side buffer from
the mean shoreline shapefile. Then the “extract by mask” tool was used to clip the
raster files to that buffer. The result was a smaller file that was easier to work with.
Next the “raster calculator” tool from the “Map Algebra” toolbox was used to add
the tsunami runup projection taken from the SLO County Tsunami Emergency Response
Plan (12.1m) to the DEM. This runup estimation was used because it is the most recent
projection used by SLO County, and represents a worst case scenario. This study was
done with SLO County in mind as a client, so using their accepted runup estimate
maintains consistency between county planning documents.
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Then the “minus” tool was used to subtract the 12.1 m from all of the areas on
the DEM greater than 12.1m in elevation. This resulted in a “bathtub” type of flood
model, where all areas under 12.1 meters on the DEM are filled in. Now the model
showing runup was complete, and it remained to find out the water depth per parcel.
The “zonal statistic” tool was used to do this. This tool averaged the water depth
in each parcel, which could then be associated with the buildings on those parcels. To
make this data usable it had to be converted to a vector format. This was done by using
the “feature to point” tool to convert the buildings layer to centroid points instead of
polygons. Then the “extract values to points” tool was used to add the DEM’s averaged
runup depth to the building centroid. The resulting map shows the average expected
water depth for each building (Figure 1.).

Figure 1. Averaged Inundation Depths in Downtown
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Accuracy of the runup modeling was ensured by creating a topographic layer
from the original DEM using 2 meter isolines. Using this it was possible to visually verify
that the runup raster layer went as far inland as the 12 meter isoline. This same visual
inspection was done using a SLO County supplied topographic layer. In both cases the
runup model was either near or in line with the two different topographic layers’ 12 meter
(40 foot) lines. A series of eight GPS points were also taken using a TopCon GPS unit at
prominent street corners in Cayucos to ensure the layer’s spatial accuracy on the
ground.
Data Collection and Analysis
There are 745 buildings located in the study area’s 500 year inundation zone. Of
these, 700 are private residential buildings; the remaining 45 are various commercial
and government buildings in and around the downtown. Some are historical buildings,
but the majority are of relatively modern construction. A preliminary inspection of the
residential areas revealed that these buildings are largely similar in construction
material, size, and shape. To speed the collection of data, Google’s Street View program
was used to assess these buildings. Google’s Street View offered current images of the
area that could be used in conjunction with GIS, and allowed for effective surveying in
these more homogeneous areas. Surveying the downtown area of Cayucos was done
on foot. Also, on the ground data collection was used to resolve data issues as they
arose. Field data was collected using hard copy data sheets (Appendix D.) and later
entered into an Excel spreadsheet. Data collected via Google Street View was directly
entered into the spreadsheet. Data collected was based on the PTVA model and
included:
Water depth (a), weight=8- based on GIS projections, the average water depth for each
building was automatically assigned. While the tsunami modeled for this study was one
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with 12.1 meter runup. The water depth that actually reached buildings was found to
range from 0 to 8.4 meters in buildings in Cayucos.
Building row from the ocean (b), weight=7- data collected for this field was based on
a building’s location relative to the ocean. Data was coded with a score of 12 equaling
the first, ocean front row. Subsequent inland rows were assigned scores in descending
order to zero. In places the layout of the community is somewhat unorganized and rows
of buildings are staggered or not well defined. In these cases a building’s score was
based on how many buildings are between it and the ocean.
Building Material (c), weight=6- Reinforced concrete construction is the least
vulnerable, followed by masonry or concrete block; wooden buildings rate as the most
vulnerable. The majority of the buildings in Cayucos are clearly of wood construction.
Others have a stucco veneer. Common in California, these homes often have a wood
frame with a thin veneer of concrete lining the outer walls. A problem with this is that,
viewed from the street, it may not be possible to tell if a stucco home is of wood frame,
cast concrete, or concrete block construction.
For this study it was assumed that these homes have a wood frame and were
classified in this most vulnerable class. The PTVA method does not account for this
type of construction and how these types of buildings perform during a tsunami is
unknown. It is possible that the stucco veneer could aid in preserving structural integrity
by resisting wave forces during a tsunami, but further research is needed to determine
where these types of buildings fall on the vulnerability scale.
Number of floors (d), weight=5- The number of floors not including attics. Second
stories can aid in “vertical evacuation” of residents during floods and tsunamis.
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Building orientation (e), weight=4- The orientation of a building relative to the ocean. A
cubic building with walls parallel to the shore is the most vulnerable. Those with a
corner to the ocean or irregular in shape are somewhat less vulnerable as they receive
less force from oncoming waves.
Condition of building (f), weight=3- New buildings and buildings in good condition are
less vulnerable to damage during a tsunami than unmaintained or dilapidated ones.
Most of the buildings in Cayucos are new or otherwise in a good, maintained condition.
Building surroundings (g), weight=2- The presence of durable protective structures
can influence tsunami vulnerability. Sturdy, high walls can act to keep water and debris
out of buildings. In Cayucos there are few protective barriers in place. Many homes
have decorative walls for landscaping purposes, or picket fences. There are relatively
few actual walls around buildings.
Land cover (h), weight=1- The rates the ability of the surrounding land cover to lessen
tsunami damage. Owing to the aridity of the region, there is a paucity of vegetative
cover and few large trees in Cayucos. Most properties were rated in the most vulnerable
class for this attribute.
After the GIS modeling and data collection were complete, the PTVA method
was closely followed to calculate building vulnerability scores. Raw scores for the eight
data fields were standardized into ratios by dividing the individual score by the highest
possible score for that data field. This resulted in a standardization of scores to between
0 and 1 for each data attribute.
Next the ratio scores were weighted according to the weighting scale developed
by Papathoma. To do this the ratio scores for each attribute were multiplied by the
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weight associated with that field. The weighted scores were then summed to yield an
overall “vulnerability” score.
Vulnerability=(8xa)+(7xb)+(6xc)+(5xd)+(4xe)+(3xf)+(2xg)+(1xh)
“a,b,c,d,e,f,g, and h” are the ratio scores of each attribute. This calculation yielded
vulnerability scores between 12.3 and 36. These weighted scores were then grouped
into five equal interval ranges and assigned a corresponding vulnerability rating (Table
3.). According to the PTVA model, buildings that scored “high” and “medium high” were
considered to be complete losses. Inundation depth is the most important factor in
deciding vulnerability, and those building that scored “high” and “medium high” are
largely associated with higher inundation levels (generally >4 meters). Those buildings
that received lower vulnerability scores would certainly sustain damage during a
tsunami, but would likely be repairable (Dominey-Howes et al., 2010). The scale is an
estimation of relative vulnerability to damages, rather than an estimation of specific
damages. The PTVA model does not account for partial damage or damage to the
contents of buildings.
Table 3. Vulnerability Rating Scale

Equal Interval Score Ranges
31.3-36.
26.55-31.29
21.8-26.54
17.05-21.79
12.3-17.04

Vulnerability Rating
high
med-high
medium
med-low
low

23

3. Results
After mapping and applying the PTVA model we see that 32% of the
community’s buildings are within the 500-year inundation zone (Figure 2.). These
buildings had a range of vulnerability scores from medium low to high that generally
correlated with higher (>4 meter) inundation; resulting in a total of 18.5 % of all buildings
in Cayucos likely to suffer complete destruction (assuming that all buildings ranked in the
high and medium high vulnerability classes will be completely destroyed (DomineyHowes, et al, 2010)). Many of the most affected buildings are also very important ones;
downtown businesses as well as civic and government buildings.
The highest vulnerability ratings and inundation levels are found in the low lying
downtown area and the residential area along Old Creek. Also, most ocean front homes
fall into the medium high classification and are considered total losses by the PTVA
assessment model. Within the inundation area we can expect a loss of 56.8% of all
buildings (high and medium-high ratings). Although the medium and medium low rated
buildings would escape complete destruction according to the model; they would
undoubtedly suffer damages, and the PTVA model does not account for partial damage
or damage to the contents of buildings. Also, some notable structures in Cayucos could
not be assessed with the PTVA model: a trailer park, water treatment facility, and the
pier.
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Figure 2. PTVA Assessment Results
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Commercial Buildings and Downtown
Most of the commercial buildings in Cayucos are in the 500 year inundation
zone, and are very vulnerable to tsunami damage. The downtown water front area is
low lying and the GIS model predicts inundation of up to 8 meters here. Eighty percent of
buildings here scored high and medium high and are likely to be lost (Figure 3.). This
represents a serious loss to the community. All of these buildings are in the downtown
area and many are tourist attractions such as shops, hotels, and restaurants. The few
jobs that exist in Cayucos are tied to these businesses, putting the economic existence
of the community at risk. Also, a small gas station is located in the inundation area
downtown. Flooding could potentially cause a release of petroleum products, fouling the
local waterfront or causing fires (Figure 4.).
Additionally, the small Cayucos fire station scored medium high and is likely to be
lost, depriving fire fighters of the use of its facilities and equipment. The station could be
rendered totally irrelevant at a time when it is needed the most. There is another fire
station, operated by CAL FIRE, on the south side of Cayucos that is outside of the
inundation area. This is a small station with limited capabilities, staffed only by a fire
captain and one to four fire fighters with one engine (Cal Fire, 2014). This small station
is designed to respond to auto accidents and ocean rescues, and may be overwhelmed
by an emergency on the scale of a tsunami. The Cayucos elementary school is on the
upper edge of the inundation area. Several of its buildings scored medium in the
vulnerability assessment, and others are actually outside of the modeled inundation
zone.
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Figure 3. Commercial Building Vulnerability

Figure 4. Downtown Cayucos Building Vulnerability
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Housing
Houses in the inundation area are very vulnerable. Homes in Cayucos are
generally one and two story, of wood frame construction, parallel to the ocean and
without much vegetation or protective structures around them. There is nothing about
many of them that afford any tsunami resistance. A total of 55.8% of houses scored
high and medium high on the vulnerability scale. No houses in the inundation area rated
low, and very few (3.7%) rated medium low (figure 5.). Given a 500 year tsunami event
with a 12.1 meter runup, all of the houses in the inundation area would suffer damage,
and about half would be total losses.
According to the 2010 U.S. Census the average household size in Cayucos is
1.97 people per household. Multiplying this figure by the 700 homes affected leads to the
conclusion that 1,379 people might potentially be put out of their homes. Since 55.8 %
of homes are expected to be completely destroyed 769 people may be left permanently
homeless. However, an unknown (but likely significant) percentage of houses in
Cayucos are known to be either second homes or vacation rentals. Depending on
whether the actual tsunami struck during tourist season or a weekend or holiday, the
number of displaced could be higher or lower than the estimated 1,379. Also, given that
some houses in Cayucos are second homes the actual number of people left
permanently homeless is likely to be less than 769.

28

Figure 5. Housing Vulnerability

Other Vulnerable Areas


A trailer park is located on the bank of Cayucos Creek, a vulnerable area, but
was not included in the study’s PTVA assessment as trailers are not accounted
for in the original methodology. Given their light construction and lack of
foundations, trailers are undoubtedly highly vulnerable to tsunamis, and in the
event of one striking many trailers would be lost. Also, as they are not
permanent structures, the number of trailers in the trailer park can vary, making
accurate accounting difficult. Approximately a third of the trailer park is within the
modeled inundation zone.



The Cayucos water treatment facility is located a short distance from the ocean,
up Old Creek. The facility consists of a large, circular tank, a few metal buildings
and settling ponds. These buildings were not suitable for analysis with the PTVA
method. However the tsunami inundation model indicates the possibility of 4.7
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meters of water in this area, making it unlikely that the plant could continue
operations or remain intact. The flooding of this facility could result in the loss of
drinking water for all of Cayucos and possibly the contamination of Old Creek
with chemicals.


The iconic Cayucos pier, central to the community’s identity and appeal to
tourists, is located downtown at the mouth of Cayucos Creek. It is over a hundred
years old and built of wood. The SLO County LHMP states that docks and piers
are very vulnerable to tsunami damage. Given its material and age, it is unlikely
to survive inundation by the 12.1 meter tsunami modeled in this assessment.



There are several bridges in and around Cayucos that could be vulnerable to
damage during a large tsunami. These include Ocean Avenue bridge, Old Creek
bridge, and Torro Creek bridge. If these were impassible following a tsunami it
would seriously impair relief and recovery efforts.

Modeling a More Resistant Community
A strength of the PTVA model is that it is dynamic. Attribute scores can be
manipulated to calculate different theoretical outcomes. For example, since the majority
of the buildings in Cayucos are built of the most vulnerable material (wood, raw score 3)
and also oriented in the most vulnerable way (parallel to the ocean, raw score 3) we can
change the scores in these attribute fields to model a scenario in which the study area’s
buildings are built of more sturdy materials, and with a less vulnerable orientation. To do
this, raw scores for the building material and orientation attributes were changed from
3’s to 2’s, and the scores recalculated. The result allows for a view into how building
attributes, like those governed by building codes, might influence the community’s
overall survivability.
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Modeling the new scenario we see quite a different outcome in vulnerability
ratings (figure 6. and 7.). The new hypothetical Cayucos is far less vulnerable to a 500
year tsunami. Owing to the increased durability of materials and building orientation that
attenuates wave force, the number of buildings in the most vulnerable building classes
(high and medium high) are reduced by 71.9% (58.8% to 16.5%) in the new model. By
avoiding wood structures and parallel orientation to the shoreline, the model suggests
that significant gains in overall survivability can be attained. This in no way substitutes
for an in-depth structural engineering study of tsunami resistant building design. Rather,
it roughly indicates what gains in survivability could be attained through building design,
and the results are dramatic. Adopting special building codes for tsunami prone areas
could be a positive long-term mitigation strategy in SLO County.
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Figure 6. Revised Vulnerability Ratings for a Theoretically More Durable
Cayucos

Figure 7. The Study’s Original Results
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4. Conclusion
The PTVA’s Pros and Cons
The PTVA model goes into far greater detail than studies in existing state and
local hazard mitigation plans. It proves to be a user friendly, useful tool to delineate the
most vulnerable areas, down to the individual building, and to discover probable tsunami
impacts. However the PTVA model does have limitations.
One limitation with the model is the time consuming data collection and ground
truthing inherent to it. Cayucos is small enough to complete a 100 percent sample of
buildings in the inundation area. However in other communities there could be
thousands of buildings to assess, making a 100 percent sample lengthy, if not
impossible. The alternative to a 100 percent sample is taking a representative sample
and then using inferential statistics to calculate scores for the un-sampled buildings.
Another limitation is the classification of building materials used in the model.
The model only accounts for three classes of material:
1. Wood frame, steel frame with wood walls
2. Stone and concrete and brick
3. Reinforced concrete
In the Cayucos there are many buildings that have a stucco veneer, and fell in no
obvious category. The PTVA model was not developed in California, and does not reflect
common local construction methods. The building material attribute must be correct for
types of construction in the region that it is being used in. An expanded palette of
material classes would be a great improvement to the model.
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Though the model has been validated in the field by looking at damage caused
by actual tsunamis, it should be not be relied on as a definitive prediction of damage.
There are many factors affecting how tsunamis are generated and interact with the
urban environment; some of which have yet to be understood. The model also depends
on using runup predictions that do have the chance of being exceeded, perhaps
dramatically. The 2011 tsunami in Japan showed that tsunami and earthquake events
can exceed predicted levels of magnitude. Additionally, the exceedance of these
estimates will be more likely as sea level rise impacts the coast (up to 5.48 feet). It
cannot be stressed enough that findings in this type of study are estimates for planning
purposes and not precise predictions of damage.
Planning Discussion and Recommendations
Despite any shortcomings inherent to the PTVA, this report has gone into a much
deeper level of study than any existing documents about the area’s tsunami vulnerability.
This, in conjunction with the LHMP, Tsunami Emergency Response Plan and CAL
FIRE’s tsunami planning map allow for a more than basic understanding of the
community's tsunami vulnerability. In the future our understanding will continue to grow
with the development of probabilistic tsunami modeling, and building fragility curves.
There are many things that could be done to mitigate the hazard detailed in this
study. Efforts can range from large, capital intensive building projects to the institution of
educational programs. Deciding just what measures to take and striking a balance
between costs and benefits associated with planning for a 500-year return interval
tsunami is a considerable challenge. Planning for a 500-year return interval tsunami has
already been done by the county; evacuation areas were based on 500-year runup
estimations. Some more extreme mitigation measures may simply not be politically
possible given the limited risk of the hazard and budgetary constraints. Deciding what
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further measures to take could benefit from an ongoing discussion with Cayucos
residents to gauge their perception of the risk.
Ideally we could avoid new development in tsunami run-up areas to minimize
future tsunami losses; but Cayucos is nearly at “build out”, especially on the ocean front.
There are only a few vacant lots in the inundation area: notably, a handful along
Cayucos Creek, two large commercial lots on N. Ocean Avenue in downtown, and
several small residential lots scattered in the Pacific Drive area. Limiting the
development of these lots for tsunami mitigation by the County is extremely unlikely as it
could be politically unpopular and hinder economic development, while purchasing them
may be prohibitively expensive.
Focusing on evacuation and education may be the most effective method to limit
loss of life during the next tsunami. Evacuating northern Cayucos may not be too
problematic. There are excellent maps from CAL FIRE that detail evacuation routes, and
a system of warning sirens is in place to issue warnings. Gaining high ground does not
require a long drive or walk in Cayucos. A walk of approximately a quarter mile (1300
feet) is all that is required to exit the inundation area from anywhere in downtown. The
residential areas along Pacific Avenue require an even shorter walk to safety, of about
500 feet, and there are many streets leading inland that offer evacuation routes.
Evacuation of these areas is relatively simple as they do not require pedestrians to cross
any barriers, like Highway 101 which runs right through the community.
The situation is different in southern Cayucos. Evacuating the inundation area
along low lying Studio Drive on foot would require crossing Highway 101. While the
distance to safety in this area is not great, the highway offers a serious impediment. In
addition to high traffic volume that could be present during a general evacuation, there
are also wire fences lining the highway to keep out people and animals. Unless people
are willing to jump the fence, crossing the highway on foot requires using one of only
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three roads leading from the highway into the long, narrow Studio Drive corridor. If one
could directly cross the highway, the walk to safety would be only 300 to 500 feet.
However, traveling to an intersection and then crossing the highway increases the walk
to 900-1600 feet.
Evacuating Cayucos by car may not be a problem for most people; the area has
well developed and maintained roadways and generally low traffic. However, bridges on
Highway 101 could become impassable in the event of high tsunami inundation. This
would cut Cayucos off from emergency services coming from larger cities to the south,
and deprive people of what may be their first choice of an evacuation route. Access to
the inland cities of Paso Robles and Atascadero would still be available via Old Creek rd.
and Highway 46 to the north.
There are many efforts that could be undertaken to educate the public about
evacuations, the risk of tsunamis and the potential extent of the inundation area.
Teaching people what to do, where to go, and how to get there in the event of a tsunami
may be the most efficient mitigation strategy for protecting them. There are simple ways
to accomplish this. For example, in Hawaii there are inundation maps published in the
local phone books, and signs demarcating tsunami inundation zones in populated areas.
Becoming Tsunamiready® will ensure that these types of education materials are
available to educate residents about the danger presented by tsunamis, and that local
government is prepared to respond.
As the federal and state governments begin to implement tsunami mitigation
there are still some local measures that could be taken. Looking to principles from the
Tsunami Policy Working Group’s 2015 report can provide guidance for further specific
measures that could be applied to Cayucos. The principles encourage short and long
term strategies, some that incorporate multiple hazards. These include:
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1. Implementing a new building code for inundation areas that ensures tsunami
resistant designs for new buildings.
As figures 6 and 7 show, building design has the potential to greatly
improve survivability during tsunami inundation. Building codes designed for
safety and hazard mitigation are certainly not new in California. They already
exist for fire and earthquake resistance. Tsunami resistant building codes would
affect relatively few future construction projects (only those within the mapped
inundation zone) while increasing the county’s resilience to tsunamis. Standards
for this are currently being developed. The International Building Code will
contain updates for tsunami resistance by 2018 (CGS, 2015). These codes
could become mandated by the state if designated tsunami inundation zones are
formed. Otherwise it is in SLO County’s jurisdiction to implement new building
codes in coastal areas.

2. Creating policies for retrofitting public buildings to ensure tsunami survivability,
and offer vertical evacuation for residents.
The technology for designing raised, tsunami proof shelters is already
developed. Often they are constructed of concrete and steel; or soil in
“engineered high ground” that can be incorporated into parks and openspace
(FEMA, 2009). FEMA has published a design manual Guidelines for Design of
Structures for Vertical Evacuation from Tsunamis, and the west coast’s first
vertical evacuation structure is under construction in Westport, Oregon. There, a
school on a flat peninsula with limited evacuation routes is being built with a
raised shelter for students.
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This is a long- term mitigation strategy that could be difficult and
expensive to implement. In a place like Cayucos, where ocean views are
important to people, the tall structure of a vertical tsunami shelter may block
views and be unpopular with residents. The cost of this measure could also be
prohibitive in a small community, and the benefit may be marginal. The most
vulnerable and densely inhabited place in Cayucos, the downtown, may be
evacuated on foot by walking approximately a quarter mile. Assuming that
people know what to do in the event of an earthquake and local tsunami it is
reasonable to believe that all ambulatory people could make it to a safe area.
However, a structure should not be ruled out. Having one would provide shelter
to those who may not be physically able to evacuate or if a locally produced
tsunami came in with no time for warnings or evacuation by foot. A vertical
shelter may make more sense for the Studio Drive area than the downtown,
given the greater difficulty involved in evacuating the former.

3. Incorporating tsunami hazards into regional land–use planning and strategies to
mitigate climate impacts, such as increasingly intense coastal storms, coastal
flooding, and sea level rise.
In Cayucos there are opportunities for tsunami mitigation that could also
mitigate coastal erosion and sea level rise. These include:
1. Developing policies to prevent post-tsunami redevelopment of the most
vulnerable waterfront parcels.
2. Strengthening the downtown seawall.
After a tsunami has devastated a city, there is the option of not rebuilding in
flood prone areas. Hilo, Hawaii as a good example of this. Downtown Hilo used
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to look much like Cayucos with a water front row of commercial buildings. In the
1960’s the most flood prone areas of the city were abandoned after suffering the
loss of 219 people and millions of dollars in damage to two tsunamis in the space
of fourteen years (Curtis, 2008). This included the waterfront block formerly
occupied by commercial buildings. Hawaii County acquired the water front
parcels using federal redevelopment funds, and these areas are now open space
that serve as a park as well as a buffer against future tsunamis, coastal flooding
and sea level rise.
A similar decision was made in New York City in the wake of Hurricane
Sandy where extreme flooding affected many coastal residential areas. The
governor of New York used Federal Community Development Block Grant
Disaster Recovery Program funds to buy and demolish damaged houses in high
risk areas, at pre-Sandy prices. He says the land will be “given back to mother
nature” to serve as a buffer to future storm surge (Jervey, 2013).
As sea level rises and tsunamis and storm surge come to affect more
urban areas, more frequently, we may see a gradual, nationwide retreat from
water front properties. One day Cayucos may end up looking like Hilo, with open
space in place of its first row of waterfront buildings. After the tragic event of a
tsunami, this could be a good option for Cayucos. Not rebuilding the first row of
buildings would not only mitigate the effects of tsunamis, erosion and sea level
rise on the downtown, but could benefit the community in other ways, by
increasing recreation space and enhancing ocean views.
The 500-year tsunami modeled in this study may not strike for hundreds
or thousands of years, making the policy of preventing rebuilding a moot point at
this time. However, sea level rise and increased vulnerability to erosion and
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storm surge are here today. Building a modern, concrete seawall may be a good
investment to protect the first block of oceanfront buildings and downtown from
future flooding. Properly designed and built seawalls have been shown to limit
tsunami damage to areas behind them (Dominey-Howes, 2007), and can provide
protection against tsunamis as well as sea level rise and coastal erosion (CA
OES, 2013).
The current seawall in downtown Cayucos appears to have been built in
stages over the years. It consists of four sections of varying heights and
materials: the southernmost and northernmost sections are low rock rip-rap,
while the middle is divided in two halves composed of concrete approximately
two meters high, and cinder block about one meter high. The seawall seems to
have been adequate until now, but as sea level rises up to five feet in the next
century, increased erosive forces could act on the beach. As this beach erodes
more wave force will begin to act upon the seawall, and the more weakly
constructed sections of the wall could fail.
There are several modern concrete designs of seawalls that could work
for Cayucos. For example, a curved design, of reinforced concrete would direct
wave energy back to sea and prevent most waves from overtopping it.
Constructing these modern seawalls can be expensive, as building one involves
careful engineering and quality materials. The cost of constructing a seawall can
run well into the millions of dollars (Linham, 2010). Also, there are maintenance
costs involved if a seawall is to remain functioning at peak performance.
There are several disadvantages to seawalls. Seawalls can be
undermined by wave action and fail, or the land flanking the wall may become
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naturally eroded and result in a stepped appearance of the coast or even help
undermine the seawall. They can also starve the beach of sediment that would
otherwise have come from the protected land, thus protecting the land while
increasing beach erosion (Linham, 2010). A modern seawall could protect
against landward erosion, storm surge, and sea level rise but may not be enough
protection from all tsunamis. Any seawall may be no match for the 500-year, 40
foot tsunami modeled in this study; but could confer protection against lesser,
more probable tsunami events. The multi-hazard mitigation aspect of a seawall
makes this a viable option for Cayucos.

4. Encouraging property owners and renters located within State-designated
tsunami hazard zones to obtain coverage from the National Flood Insurance
Program (NFIP).
There are no practical measures that can be used to physically protect all
of the houses and businesses in the inundation area from tsunamis. Educating
people about the need for, and availability of, insurance may be more effective at
protecting their assets than physical measures. Directing people towards
insurance, including subsidized insurance as it is available, is the right thing to do
in the situation.
The PTVA method has proven useful in assessing vulnerability in a small coastal
town, and could easily be applied to other coastal communities in the county. This study
took a single researcher nine months of part time work to complete. A significant portion
of this time was spent figuring out how to apply the PTVA model to Cayucos and using
GIS to model inundation, update the incomplete buildings layer, and input data in

41

conjunction with Google Street view. Being familiar with using the PTVA model and
working full time would significantly speed the process.
This study has uncovered that the majority of buildings in the inundation area,
and the majority of commercial buildings in Cayucos, are vulnerable not just to
inundation, but also to complete destruction. This extreme vulnerability is a result of the
low lying coast and also the fact that most buildings in Cayucos happen to be
constructed in a way that makes them highly vulnerable to tsunamis. Fortunately the
chance of a 500-year tsunami event occurring like the one modeled in this study is only
.2% each year. However, it is a question of when and not if a major tsunami event will
affect San Luis Obispo County. Until that day comes we must strive to increase our
preparedness as much as is practically possible. It is the author’s hope that this study
will play at least a small role in helping to protect lives and property in the future.
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APPENDICES

Appendix A. SLO Fire Department, Northern Cayucos Inundation Map
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Appendix B. NWS/NOAA TsunamiReady® Guidelines

Guidelines

Guideline 1: Communications and Coordination
Established 24-hour Warning Point (WP)
Established Emergency Operations Center (EOC)
Guideline 2: Tsunami Warning Reception
Number of ways for EOC/WP to receive NWS
tsunami messages. (If in range, one must be NWR
receiver with tone alert; NWR-SAME is preferred)
Guideline 3: Local Warning Dissemination
Number of ways EOC/WP can disseminate warnings
to public
NWR - SAME receivers in public facilities
For county/borough warning points, county/borough
communication network that ensures information
flow among communities
Guideline 4: Community Preparedness
Number of annual tsunami awareness programs
Designate/establish tsunami shelter/area in safe zone
Designate tsunami evacuation areas and evacuation
routes, and install evacuation route signs
Provide written, locally specific, tsunami hazard
response material to public
Schools: Encourage tsunami hazard curriculum,
practice evacuations (if in hazard zone), and provide
safety material to staff and students.
Guideline 5: Administrative
Formal tsunami hazard operations plan
Biennial meeting between emergency manager and
NWS
Visit by NWS official to community at least every
other year
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Appendix C. Map of Cayucos
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Appendix D. Field Data Sheet
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